Title
The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations:
Author
Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole
Date
1/01/2005
(Original Publish Date: 2/9/2005)
(Original Publish Date: 2/9/2005)
Abstract
This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.