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How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of Frand Bargaining

Title
How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of Frand Bargaining
Author
Dorsey Elyse, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date
6/24/2013
(Original Publish Date: 4/16/2013)
Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") recently closed its investigation of Google, following a thorough analysis of numerous aspects of Google's business conduct. The Proposed Consent Order into which the FTC and Google tentatively entered has garnered significant attention from the antitrust and intellectual property communities for a number of reasons. One important reason is that the Proposed Consent Order places serious limits upon Google's ability to seek injunctive relief for its patents that are considered "standard-essential" and that are subject to fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") commitments. This limitation reflects the emerging tendency of competition agencies to consider the threat or pursuit of injunctive relief a serious competitive concern when the patent at issue is standard essential and the patent holder previously agreed to license that patent on FRAND terms.
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