Title
A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges
Author
Jorge L. Contreras
Date
4/23/2014
(Original Publish Date: 8/17/2015)
(Original Publish Date: 8/17/2015)
Abstract
Patent holders are, with increasing frequency, making public promises to refrain from asserting patents under certain conditions, or to license patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND). These promises or “patent pledges” generally precede formal license agreements and other contracts, but are nevertheless intended to induce the market to make expenditures and adopt common technology platforms without the fear of patent infringement. But despite their increasing prevalence, current contract, property and antitrust law theories used to explain and enforce patent pledges have fallen short. Thus, a new theory is needed to secure the market-wide benefits that patent pledges can offer.