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Rambus Redux: The FTC Tries One Last Time (and so do I)
Authored by: tig on Friday, December 19 2008 @ 02:07 PM CST
Well you're not educating anyone.

I'll help Andy out, since he's a busy guy and you seem unable to see anything other than through rose colored glasses in reading the "Rambus roadmaop to victory" as the investor's club (or cult) is used to calling the vacated Initial Decision of the FTC's ALJ.

Here's a relevant excerpt:

"In the Order On Complaint Counsel' s Motions For Default Judgment And For
Argument, issued February 26 2003 , seven rebuttable adverse presumptions
were imposed
against Respondent. ("February 26 2003 Order ). The February 26 2003 Order
was issued to
resolve Complaint Counsel' s motion for default judgment relating to
Respondent' s destruction of
evidence. In that Order, the Court determined that "(When Rambus instituted
its document
retention policy in 1998, it did so, in part, for the purpose of getting rid
of documents that might
be harmful" in future anticipated litigation involving "its JEDEC related
patents. " February 26
2003 Order at 5 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, this Court has
expressed "significant
and ongoing concerns about the Respondent directing its employees to conduct
a wholesale
destruction of documents and failing to create an inventory of what was
destroyed." Order
Denying Complaint Counsel' s Motion for Additional Adverse Inferences and
Other Appropriate
Relief, issued April 15, 2003 , at 4. The Court further indicated that the
spoliation issue is not
closed to future reconsideration after trial." Id at 4 n. 2 (emphasis in
While the Commssion wil not tolerate spoliation efforts afecting its Part 3
proceedings, the document destruction issue in this case, based on the
conclusions reached herein
does not warrant the Court' s continued attention. Rambus s conduct in this
regard is, at best
troublesome. In a different cause of action, the Court might well have
sanctioned Rambus for
having deprived Complaint Counsel of their ability to present the merits of
the case and thereby
prejudicing Complaint Counsel and the adjudicative process. See, e. g.,
Anderson v. Cryovac
Inc. 862 F.2d 910 925 (1st Cir. 1988).
However, the process here has not been prejudiced as there is no indication
that any
documents, relevant and material to the disposition of the issues in this
case, were destroyed.
fact, Complaint Counsel noted that the record shows "an unusual degree of
visibility into the
precise nature of Rambus s conduct." (Opening Statement, Tr. 15). Moreover,
as discussed
below, none of the adverse presumptions are material to the disposition of
the case."
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