Standards <Meta>Library
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| Title: | "Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems" |
| Author: | Thomas Hazlett |
| Publication Date: | November 22 2011 |
| Date Added: | January 13 2012 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Dynamic competitive forces are dramatically altering mobile markets in the U.S. and around the world. Wireless networks, having sunk considerable capital in the creation of phone systems, must not only compete among themselves for subscribers, but also need to form strategic alliances with emerging handset application platforms (HAPs) created by such firms as Research in Motion (Blackberry), Apple (iPhone), and Google (Android). Current developments illustrate two fundamental aspects of innovation. First, that innovations created by one set of investors may generate returns for complementary suppliers, either via coordinated activity (strategic platforms) or competitive rivalry (appropriation). Second, that the efficiency of such ecosystems may be enhanced by market structure innovations that either extend vertical control or delimit it. This runs counter to the prevailing popular and regulatory sentiment that “open” platforms offer categorically superior welfare outcomes than do “closed” systems – aka “walled gardens". |
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| Title: | "To Select or Not? Dealing with Competing Standards in Public IT Procurement" |
| Author: | Tineke Egyedi |
| Publication Date: | January 3 2012 |
| Date Added: | January 13 2012 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | This report addresses the problem how governments should deal with competing standards, that is, two or more functionally equivalent standards, in the context of public IT-procurement. The focus is on (open) committee standards. The research questions are In the context of public IT procurement, should governments choose between standards that have the same functionality? If so, what factors should be taken into consideration? The study has been funded with research grants from the Dutch Standardisation Forum, a forum involved in drawing up lists of selected ICT-standards for government organisations, and the Open Forum Academy, a platform for stimulating research and discussion on open standards and interoperability. This report aims to contribute towards discussion about competing standards and help those concerned with public IT procurement and procurement policy account for their decision(s). To this end it synthesizes scientific literature from different disciplines, in particular, economic, innovation and technology management studies. It interrelates the partly disparate themes of market impact of standards, standards wars, standards dynamics and converter solutions. |
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| Title: | "Key Issues Impacting Global Standardization and Conformance: Today and Tomorrow" |
| Author: | American National Standards Institute (ANSI) |
| Publication Date: | November 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | December 19 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that standards and conformity assessment impact more than 80% of global commodity trade. From design and manufacturing to distribution and marketing, all traded products and services are affected at some point in the supply chain by standardization. Today’s business climate is global in nature and scope, and the U.S. standardization system has evolved rapidly to keep pace with the demands of the marketplace. In this white paper, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) offers some perspectives from the U.S. private sector on key issues affecting global standards and conformance – today and tomorrow. |
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| Title: | "Copyright in Standards: Open or Shut Case" |
| Author: | Berger Tyrone |
| Publication Date: | November 17 2011 |
| Date Added: | December 12 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | This article investigates some key problems surrounding copyright in standards. It surveys two ex ante approaches, namely the management of the underlying intellectual property rights during a standard’s development stage, and creating an exemption that is incorporated in legislation, and that provides for a compulsory licence. I further suggest an ex post notice, or opt-in approach, for copyright owners, to resolve the uncertainty around when copyright permission should be sought by users. |
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| Title: | "Open Standards and Global Politics" |
| Author: | Laura DeNardis |
| Publication Date: | December 1 2009 |
| Date Added: | November 23 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | A central purview of Internet governance is the development of Internet technical protocols, the standards that enable interoperability between diverse technologies and cultures. Standards are a form of technological rulemaking with public interest implications in areas such as public safety, national security, electronic medical records, eGovernment, individual privacy, and political and artistic expression. From an economic standpoint, the openness and intellectual property arrangements of technical standards can determine the extent of competition, trade, and innovation in technology markets. Universal and open technical standards have been identified as a precursor to the affordable and equitable diffusion of information and communication technologies around the globe. However, the institutional processes, technical and legal infrastructures, and underlying intellectual property arrangements of standards do not always create an opening to reflect the interests of developing countries. This paper examines ways in which the degree of openness in standards has pronounced implications for developing countries and beyond and concludes with recommendations for promoting open standards through institutional processes, intellectual property arrangements, and government procurement policies. |
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| Title: | "E-Governance Policies for Interoperability and Open Standards" |
| Author: | Laura DeNardis |
| Publication Date: | June 24 2010 |
| Date Added: | November 23 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Information and communication technology standards are increasingly intertwined with functions that are paradigmatic responsibilities of governments. The degree of openness in technical standards can have public policy implications in several areas: a nation's innovation and competition policy; the ability of governments to efficiently and cost effectively perform services such as national security, disaster response, and e-health administration; and the ways in which standards serve as a form of regulation making decisions such as the extent of user privacy on the Internet. Because of these possible policy implications, governments have a vested interest in promoting open technical standards adhering to principles of transparency, cost efficiency, and interoperability. This paper examines various possibilities for governments to engage with information and communication technology standardization (e.g. development, regulation, funding, adoption) and ultimately recommends that governments, as significant parts of technology markets, can exert market influence, as well as provide efficient e-Governance functions, through procurement policies that promote open standards, often through electronic government interoperability frameworks (e-GIFs) specifying information technology standards for e-Governance infrastructures. These procurement policies are the least interventionist of possible roles for governments in standardization because they do not mandate that private industry adopt particular standards and do not intervene directly in the standards-development process. |
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| Title: | "Is the Patent Ambush Prerequisite Met? Assessing the Extent of Ex Ante IPR Disclosure within Standard Setting" |
| Author: | Anne-Layne Farrar |
| Publication Date: | August 18 2011 |
| Date Added: | November 10 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | As part of its “policy project to examine the legal and policy issues surrounding the problem of potential patent ‘hold-up’ when patented technologies are included in collaborative standards”, the Federal Trade Commission held an all-day workshop on June 21, 2011. The first panel of the day focused on patent disclosure rules and much of the discussion centered on the conditions required for patent hold up or patent ambush to occur. One of the conditions identified was early – particularly before a standard is set – disclosure of intellectual property rights. When patents are disclosed ex post, after a standard is defined, the patent holder may have enhanced bargaining power that it can exploit to charge excessive royalties (e.g., greater than the value the patented technology contributes to the standard). The theoretical debate over hold up and ambush often assumes that most standards participants disclose their patents ex ante, such that the few disclosing ex post can be considered to be bad actors at least considering hold up. In this paper, I take an empirical look at the timing of IPR disclosures within standard setting organizations. I find, contrary to the implicit assumption underlying the patent ambush debate, that most participants officially disclose their potentially relevant IPRs ex post, not ex ante, and sometimes considerably so. On the other hand, I also find that the delay in declaring IPRs to standards has been shrinking over time, with disclosures occurring closer to (although for the most part still after) the standard publication date for more recent standards as compared to earlier ones. This empirical finding has important policy implications for the treatment of patent hold up. |
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| Title: | "Patent 'Hold-Up,' Infringement Remedies, and the Operation of Standards-Setting Organizations: How the FTC’s Ill-Advised Campaign Against Innovators Threatens Incentives" |
| Author: | Roger Brooks |
| Publication Date: | September 7 2011 |
| Date Added: | November 10 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In March 2011 the FTC issued a report entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace” (the “Report”). In this Report, the FTC assumes as fact that the IP marketplace suffers a pervasive problem of “patent hold-up” in which patentees take advantage of the “sunk costs” of infringers to extract excessive royalties from licensees, and proposes to “fix” that supposed problem by weakening the remedies available against an infringer that does not voluntarily take a license. Instead, the FTC’s recommendations would disrupt and discourage voluntary licensing, discourage investment in innovation, and damage both industry participants and consumers. The FTC proposes that damages for patent infringement be limited to the “incremental value” provided by the patent over the “next best alternative,” and that courts calculating damages should fix the “hypothetical negotiation” at a time before the infringer has made any investments specific to the infringement, rather than at the time of first infringement (as under current law). In the case of standardized technologies, the FTC contends that the “hypothetical negotiation” should always be fixed prior to the adoption of the relevant standard. The Report also recommends further narrowing the cases in which an injunction could be obtained against an infringer. Following issuance of the Report, the FTC conducted a public workshop concerning patents and standards in June of 2011, and solicited public comment, receiving comment from a large number of industry participants of varying interests, as well as standards-setting organizations (“SSOs”), academics, industry analysts, and others. Issues of patent remedies and incentives for innovation are often dealt with in the academic literature as a matter of pure economic theory, using radically simplified economic models in a vacuum of empirical information. For this paper, in sharp contrast, we reviewed the entire record from the FTC workshop and public comment, and analyze the FTC’s recommendations in light of the real-world facts and perspectives provided by the commentators. We conclude that the FTC’s starting assumption that there is a systemic “patent hold-up” problem is empirically unfounded, and that indeed the great weight of industry comment says that there is not. In standardized industries in particular, SSOs uniformly report that their existing licensing policies have avoided any hold-up problems. We further conclude that the recommendation to cap patent damages by an “incremental value” measure is both theoretically incorrect and impossible for courts to apply, and that any attempt to do so would severely discourage investment in innovation. We also find that the proposal to move the time of a “hypothetical negotiation” analysis is misguided, and would encourage infringement at the expense of the voluntary negotiation of licenses - a value-destroying shift that again would discourage investment and damage consumers as well as industry participants. Finally, we find no justification for any further restriction of the patentee’s right to injunctive relief beyond the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay. |
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| Title: | "The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination" |
| Author: | Richard Epstein F. Scott Kieff Daniel Spulber |
| Publication Date: | August 5 2011 |
| Date Added: | November 10 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In its recent report entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace,” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advances a far-reaching regulatory approach (Proposal) whose likely effect would be to distort the operation of the intellectual property (IP) marketplace in ways that will hamper the innovation and commercialization of new technologies. The gist of the FTC Proposal is to rely on highly non-standard and misguided definitions of economic terms of art such as “ex ante” and “hold-up,” while urging new inefficient rules for calculating damages for patent infringement. Stripped of the technicalities, the FTC Proposal would so reduce the costs of infringement by downstream users that the rate of infringement would unduly increase, as potential infringers find it in their interest to abandon the voluntary market in favor of a more attractive system of judicial pricing. As the number of nonmarket transactions increases, the courts will play an ever larger role in deciding the terms on which the patents of one party may be used by another party. The adverse effects of this new trend will do more than reduce the incentives for innovation; it will upset the current set of well-functioning private coordination activities in the IP marketplace that are needed to accomplish the commercialization of new technologies. Such a trend would seriously undermine capital formation, job growth, competition, and the consumer welfare the FTC seeks to promote. |
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| Title: | "Equity, Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent Unenforceability Remedy" |
| Author: | Jorge L. Contreras |
| Publication Date: | October 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | November 10 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | The conventional legal analysis of technical standard setting derives primarily from antitrust law. But antitrust remedies, taken alone, may not be broad enough to address recent abuses of the standardization process. The principal example of this shortcoming is the well-known case of Rambus, Inc., which, over the course of several years, was alleged to have concealed relevant patent applications from a standards organization in which it participated and then successfully sued the entire DRAM industry for royalties after the standard was “locked-in.” Remarkably, Rambus prevailed in its litigation campaign despite aggressive enforcement efforts by the Federal Trade Commission.1 Rambus’s success stemmed, in part, from inherent limitations of the antitrust theories asserted against it to reach its opportunistic behavior. |
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| Title: | "Standardizing Intellectual Property Disclosure Data" |
| Author: | Rudi Bekkers Christian Catalini Arianna Martinelli Tim Simcoe |
| Publication Date: | May 7 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Disclosure of essential patents at standard-setting organizations provides a rich source of information that can be used for various research questions related to standards and innovation. Yet this data also has some limitations and its compilation and preparation create challenges. This paper summarizes a number of recent studies using this type of data and discusses recent efforts to create an open database. |
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| Title: | "Learning to Live with Patents: A Evolving Norms in Response to Legal Institutional Change" |
| Author: | Fiona Murray Scott Stern |
| Publication Date: | November 1 2010 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In accounts of the daily practice of scientists significant disagreement arises as to whether and how law, specifically institutions support intellectual property (IP) rights, shape scientific work. On the one hand, patents are considered to be intrusive legal instruments. On the other, it has been argued that collective social norms emerge to manage intellectual property rights and other accessrelated issues. In this paper we examine the role of social norms and ask whether they serve as a complement to or substitute for formal legal institutional arrangements. We posit that in response to legal change, two key mechanisms – acquiescence and adaptation – arise both of which require a shift in social norms: acquiescence arises rapidly at the level of individuals and organizations while adaptation operates over the long run, at the community-level, and only becomes the dominant response with time. In a quantitative analysis of this thesis we examine the causal impact of expanding IP rights on participation in the life sciences knowledge community. We find that while IP initially engenders rapid acquiescence, over time adaptation exerts an ever larger influence, facilitating participation through the development of norms that outweigh the specific details of IP rights. |
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| Title: | "Patent Pools, Thickets, and the Open Source Commercialization Strategies of Start-Up Firms" |
| Author: | Wen Wen Marco Ceccagnoli Chris Forman |
| Publication Date: | April 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | How did the introduction of open source patent pools affect the open source commercialization strategies of start-up firms? We examine the relationship between the size of open source patent pools and the entry of start-up software firms employing an open source licensing strategy between 1999 and 2009. We find that increases in the number of patents in one pool—the Patent Commons—is associated with increased open source entry. However, increases in the number of patents in a separate pool—the Open Innovation Network—is not associated with any increase in entry. Patents in both pools have a higher number of average forward citations, but a lower number of backward citations and lower number of claims. |
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| Title: | "Patent Trolls and Technology Adoption" |
| Author: | Catherine Tucker |
| Publication Date: | April 19 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | This research empirically examines whether the activities of a patent holding company can slow the spread of innovation. Patent holding companies, sometimes known as `patent trolls,' mainly pro t from the acquisition of patents and subsequent licensing agreements they reach (often following litigation) regarding these patents. Many commentators have claimed that the practices of these rms are bad for innovation. This paper explores empirically how the activities of such a patent troll has a ffected the spread of medical imaging technology. |
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| Title: | "International Standards and International Trade: Empirical Evidence from ISO 9000 Diffusion" |
| Author: | Michał Grajek |
| Publication Date: | March 25 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Empirical scholarship on the standards-trade relationship has been held up due to methodological challenges: measurement, varied effects, and endogeneity. Considering the trade-effects of one particular standard (ISO 9000), we surmount methodological challenges by measuring standardization via national penetration of ISO 9000, allowing standardization to manifest via multiple (quality-signaling, information/compliance-cost, and common-language) channels, and using instrumental variable, multilateral resistance and panel data techniques to overcome endogeneity. We find evidence of common-language and quality-signaling augmenting country-pair trade. Yet, ISO-rich nations (most notably European) benefit the most from standardization, while ISO-poor nations find ISO 9000 to represent a trade barrier due to compliance-cost effects. |
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| Title: | "Optimal Patent Policy with Recurrent Innovators" |
| Author: | Hugo Hopenhayn Matthew Mitchell |
| Publication Date: | September 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | We characterize the solution to the problem facing a planner who must allocate preferential treatment across two rms who can use preferential treatment to make pro ts, and in turn are encouraged to innovate by the provision of preferential treatment. The planner, because he can allocate preference to a single rm for multiple inno- vations at any point in time, backloads rewards, giving the rm with the preponderance of the promise a preference that corresponds to a patent offering complete exclusion. We show that the promised dura- tion of preference evolves in a region that is determined by the optimal promises in a static version of the model, which corresponds to a clas- sic static patent problem of Arrow and Nordhaus. When there are no static distortions, so that the optimal static patent lasts forever, the optimal policy we study leads to monopoly, in the sense that one rm is excluded even though it is getting useful ideas. We show that these basic results hold even if the planner is forced to use a restricted set of polices where preference is always granted immediately for any innovation that is implemented. |
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| Title: | "Innovating Standards Through Informal Consortia: The Case of Wireless Telecommunications" |
| Author: | Henry Delcamp Aija Leiponen |
| Publication Date: | September 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | We conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of technical industry consortia on the coordination of R&D strategies of the participants. Our analyses utilize membership data from 32 consortia in a variety of wireless telecommunications technology subfields from 2000 to 2005 and cross-citations between essential patents declared by the consortium participants in the context of the third-generation wireless telecommunication system UMTS and the members’ earlier patents. Our results shed new light on the role of consortia in enabling the coordination of innovation. We find that co-membership of two firms in an informal technical consortium significantly increases the likelihood that they cite each other’s patents in subsequent UMTS essential patents. In other words, inventions that are likely to become part of the UMTS telecommunication system tend to build on inventions by peers that were members in the same consortia, controlling for patent or firm fixed effects, technology class, patent quality, and other characteristics. Thus, on one hand, consortia may increase incentives to invest in R&D by internalizing potential innovation externalities. On the other hand, our results highlight the growing role of consortia in the standardization process which could be viewed as problematic, because the process may not be truly accessible for all the interested parties. Policymakers thus need to balance these two effects. For managers, the results show that participation in a variety of technical consortia enables influencing not only standard specifications, as shown in earlier research, but also peers’ innovation strategies. |
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| Title: | "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting" |
| Author: | Bernhard Ganglmair Emanuele Tarantino |
| Publication Date: | April 19 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the timing of patent disclosure by a patent holder during the process of industry standard setting. In a non-cooperative model of communication with asymmetric information we endogenize patent holdup to study the e ect of patent strength, the productivity of industry standard setting, and a standard setting organization's IPR disclosure rules. We nd that late disclosure is more likely in more productive standard setting organizations and in less competitive industries. The enforcement of antitrust laws against deceptive conduct in standard setting organizations results in earlier disclosure. |
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| Title: | "Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence From Eight Industries in the 1930S" |
| Author: | Ryan Lampe Petra Moser |
| Publication Date: | April 25 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Patent pools, which allow a group of competing firms to combine their patents, are expected to encourage innovation by limiting litigation risks and lowering transaction costs. There is no contemporary evidence on the effects of patent pools on innovation; nineteenth-century data, however, indicate that pools that operate in the absence of restrictions on anti-competitive practice discourage innovation. This paper examines the effects of eight pools that formed after the Great Depression but before the landmark Hartford decision of 1945. Difference-in-difference estimates across these pools indicate a robust negative effect of pool creation on patenting. Estimates for individual pools reveal positive effects for one pool; this effect is due to positive time trends in patenting that preceded the creation of a pool. |
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| Title: | "A New Balance between IP and Antitrust" |
| Author: | Mark Lemley |
| Publication Date: | April 12 2007 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In this article, I introduce the interaction between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust law. I describe the ways in which these two important areas of government regulation are and are not in tension, and discuss the history of the relationship between these laws. I argue that IP and antitrust have cycled between over- and under-protection, and that we are currently (and mistakenly) conditioned to think of private property and private ordering as efficient in and of themselves, rather than as efficient only in the context of robust market competition. Further, I argue that antitrust can serve the goals of innovation and dynamic efficiency directly in circumstances in which competition, not monopoly, serves as a spur to innovation. The goal of the IP and antitrust laws should be to seek a robust balance between competition and monopoly in the service of dynamic efficiency. When IP laws are strong, antitrust laws should also be strong, and vice versa. |
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| Title: | "Voluntary Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems: Enhancing Efficiency Through Trade of Entitlements" |
| Author: | Tracey Michelle Roberts |
| Publication Date: | September 27 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | Voluntary standards, private certification and labeling mechanisms are one of many forms of private governance institutions that have proliferated in recent years to permit communities to govern without government. They arise when individuals and organizations undertake collective action to reduce the negative social and environmental impacts associated with a globalized economy. The article addresses two key questions: “What do these systems do?” and “Why do they arise?” First, the article argues that voluntary standards, certification and labeling systems are “Rule 4” institutions, systems that permit parties to exchange entitlements. Drawing from Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal article, “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral,” the article explains how voluntary standards, certification and labeling systems permit consumers to correct the misallocation of entitlements by lowering the steep transaction costs that arise in global trade, including costs associated with finding willing buyers and sellers, costs associated with negotiating trades between geographically remote parties and costs associated with ascertaining the quality of credence goods. VSCL systems enhance efficiency by internalizing externalized social costs and by meeting consumer preferences associated with risk. Second, the article reveals that voluntary standards, certification and labeling systems are developed primarily in contexts marked by common pool resource dynamics. This includes both situations in which natural resources may be overharvested and are likely to suffer the “tragedy of the commons” if no intervention occurs, and situations in which the resource at stake is regulation itself and regulatory fragmentation and race to the bottom dynamics disincentivize regulatory action. To the extent that goods labeled under VSCL programs comprise an ever larger market share and have begun to be incorporated into local, state and federal law, they may signal that a tipping point has been reached and an overhaul of existing law to change the original allocation of entitlements is in order. |
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| Title: | "Look Before You 'Lock': Standards, Tipping, and the Future of Patent Misuse" |
| Author: | Christopher Suarez |
| Publication Date: | October 11 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | In network industries, consumers do not always prefer a single standard. Setting aside antitrust principles, the Federal Circuit implicitly assumed in its Princo decision that consumers preferred a single standard in the CD-R industry when it held that a patent suppression agreement did not constitute patent misuse. But some network industries can - and do - converge toward multiple standards, and antitrust analyses can be informative in this context. As this paper shows, patent suppression agreements may still “leverage” existing patents in ways that unlawfully expand their scope. This Article argues that courts must consider consumers’ demand-side preferences when they analyze patent misuse claims in network industries, and it proposes a quid-pro-quo rule that incentivizes demand-side analyses by the private sector. This rule would render suppression agreements per se legal in exchange for a commitment to release suppressed technologies into the public domain after a short time-frame, but would also support thorough patent misuse scrutiny in cases where firms refuse to make such a commitment. This rule could move us toward better empirical understandings of consumers’ preferences in network industries, preserve judicial economy in the patent misuse area, and better ensure that superior standards prevail in the marketplace. |
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| Title: | "Federal Engagement in Standards Activities to Address National Priorities Background and Proposed Policy Recommendations" |
| Author: | Subcommittee on Standards National Science and Technology Council |
| Publication Date: | October 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | This report provides a high-level overview of the current legal and policy framework for government engagement in private-sector standards activities and describes how the government engages in these activities. It summarizes stakeholder observations in response to the December 2010 Request For Information (RFI) issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology on behalf of the Subcommittee on Standards of the National Science and Technology Council about government engagement in standardization generally and in specific technology areas. Finally, the report outlines policy recommendations for consideration as a component of proposed supplementary guidance to agencies engaging in private-sector standards activities to address national priorities specified by Congressional mandate or Administration policy. |
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| Title: | "Gridlock or Greased Lightning: Intellectual Property, Government Involvement and the Smart Grid" |
| Author: | Jorge Contreras |
| Publication Date: | October 21 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is charged with overseeing the identification and selection of hundreds of standards that will be required to implement the national Smart Grid project. However, the benefits that could be realized from Smart Grid standardization are threatened by a growing number of patents that cover Smart Grid architecture and technologies. If patents that cover standardized Smart Grid elements are not revealed until technology is broadly distributed throughout the network (“locked-in”), significant disruption could occur when patent holders seek to collect unanticipated rents from large segments of the market. Moreover, even if patents are revealed early in the standardization process, there is currently no efficient way for market participants to assess the cost of implementing the standardized technologies covered by these patents before lock-in. As a result, costs to consumers can increase, competitors can be shut-out from the market, and the standardization process itself can be subverted. And far from being hypothetical, each of these scenarios has already occurred in industries that rely heavily on standardization, such as computer memory and telecommunications. In the case of the Smart Grid, however, the risk is even greater, as Smart Grid standards are mandated by law and have the potential to be adopted into both federal and state regulation, making lock-in nearly impossible to avoid and providing even greater leverage to patent holders. |
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| Title: | "Toward a Rational Framework for Sustainable Building Materials Standards" |
| Author: | Jorge Contreras Hannah Roth Meghan Lewis |
| Publication Date: | October 1 2011 |
| Date Added: | October 25 2011 |
| Free/Fee: | Free |
| Abstract: | An increasing public awareness of the impact that buildings have on human health, climate change, energy usage and environmental degradation have led in recent years to a growing interest in environmentally-sustainable building. One of the most significant factors affecting building sustainability is the sustainability of materials used in construction. Yet there is little coherence in the measurement and assessment of materials sustainability attributes, resulting in a landscape today that is littered with hundreds of competing, inconsistent and often imprecise eco-labels, standards and certifications. This discord has led both to confusion among consumers and commercial purchasers of sustainable building materials, and to the incorporation of inconsistent sustainability criteria in larger building certification programs. In response to the need for greater clarity in evaluating the sustainability of building materials, we conducted an in-depth study of sustainability standards and certifications for selected categories of building materials and have developed a set of recommendations for government, standards-setting organizations and industry that, we hope, will bring a greater degree of consistency and rationality to this critical area. These recommendations include: (1) the development of a widely-accepted, uniform nomenclature for describing materials sustainability features, (2) the development of consistent and transparent methodologies for measuring materials sustainability features, (3) the adoption of a uniform, concise and user-friendly format for disclosing key materials sustainability features, along the lines of the FDA’s standardized Nutrition Facts Label, (4) the use of consistent and comparable materials sustainability measurements as criteria in broader certification programs and regulation, and (5) the development of a public database for materials sustainability information. |
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