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Title: "Does the FTC Have a New IP Agenda?"
Author: Joshua D. Wright
Source: Federal Trade Commission
Publication Date: March 11 2014
Date Added: April 2 2014
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Regarding the approach of antitrust law to Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs"), with a focus upon the FTC's recent enforcement actions applying the antitrust laws to IPRs and FTC policy initiatives involving IPRs, and whether the FTC's recent activities at the intersection of antitrust and IPRs are simply the extension of conventional antitrust principles that have been applied to real property and other intangible assets for decades or, alternatively, do those activities suggest a new approach to the antitrust analysis of IPRs.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Upgrading India's Electronics Manufacturing Industry: Regulatory Reform and Industrial Policy"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Source: Honolulu: East-West Center
Publication Date: January 5 2014
Date Added: February 7 2014
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: India, a leading exporter of information-technology services, faces a fundamental puzzle. Its electronics industry is struggling despite a huge and growing domestic market and pockets of world-class capabilities. Drawing on survey questionnaires and interviews with key private and public industry players and multinationals, this study examines how restrictive regulations and a largely dysfunctional implementation of past support policies have constrained investment in plants and equipment and technology absorption and innovation. Electronics manufacturing remains disconnected from India's chip-design capabilities which are integrated, instead, into global networks of innovation and production. India's growing domestic demand for electronic products results in rising imports of final products and high import-dependence for key components. Bold action is required to change the anemic growth of electronics manufacturing just when the global electronics industry is rapidly ending historical strategies for growth. To achieve its potential, electronics manufacturing in India must move beyond "high-volume, low-cost" activities, towards a greater focus on "low-volume, high-value" production and on frugal innovation for the domestic market. The government's National Policy on Electronics is a first step on this path, but it needs to be complemented by reforms relating to taxation, customs, compliance, and inspections. Equally important are efforts to enhance the strategic use of technical standards and smart approaches to international trade diplomacy.
Link: Full Text

Title: "A Brief History of Frand"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
Source: Social Science Research Network
Publication Date: January 27 2014
Date Added: January 29 2014
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Much has been written lately about commitments that participants in standards-setting activities make to license their patents on terms that are "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND). These discussions pay little attention, however, to a long series of remedial patent licensing decrees issued by federal courts from the 1940s through 1970s that outwardly resemble FRAND commitments in all but the rationale for their imposition. These early decrees shed light on questions only now re-emerging as pertinent to the FRAND debate: the meaning of the non-discrimination prong of the FRAND commitment, the degree to which courts should intervene in the determination of reasonable royalty rates, the use of arbitration as a means for resolving licensing disputes, the extent to which royalty-free licensing may be "reasonable", the effects of a potential licensee's refusal to accept a patent holder's license offer, the acceptability of a patent holder's demand for reciprocal licenses from its licensees, and means for ensuring that such commitments survive the transfer of underlying patents. This article offers the first historical analysis of the patent licensing decrees issued from the 1940s through the 1970s in view of their relationship to FRAND commitments made in the standards-setting context. It concludes that these historical patent licensing orders are, in fact, the direct lineal predecessors of today's FRAND commitments, and that despite their differences, the interpretation and analysis of these remedial orders by courts, enforcement agencies and private firms offer essential insight into the interpretation of FRAND commitments today.
Link: Full Text

Title: "THE MEANING OF FRAND, PART I: ROYALTIES"
Author: J. Gregory Sidak
Source: Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Publication Date: December 2013
Date Added: December 11 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: What does it mean for a patent holder to commit to a standard-setting organization (SSO) to license its standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms? When is a royalty FRAND? Drawing from both legal theory and economic theory, I propose an interpretation of FRAND that distinguishes and reconciles the conflicting definitions of FRAND and provides courts a practical approach to identifying FRAND royalties. A proper understanding of a FRAND royalty requires recognizing the combinatorial value of standard-essential patents. That recognition reveals the fallacy in attempting to apply the "ex ante incremental value" rule to the determination of a FRAND royalty. FRAND royalties divide the aggregate royalties generated by the standard among the holders of patents essential to the standard. Such a division should maximize the surplus resulting from the standard's creation. It must also satisfy an individual-rationality constraint for the patent holder and the licensee, thereby encouraging continued participation in the setting and implementation of open standards, as opposed to greater reliance on proprietary standards.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?"
Author: Pierre Larouche
Atilano Jorge Padilla Blanco
Richard Taffet
Source: Tilberg Law School
Publication Date: October 30 2013
Date Added: December 11 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper reviews the recent proposal that SSOs amend their IPR policies to require SEP owners and willing licensees to resolve disputes over licensing terms, particularly FRAND royalty rates, using mandatory, binding baseball-style (or "final offer") arbitration. We first consider the fundamental underlying premise of the arbitration proposal - namely, that there are systemic problems relating to FRAND-based standardization and that current disputes are not being efficiently addressed. We find that mandatory baseball arbitration is a solution in search of a problem, will not necessarily afford "better" outcomes, and is more likely to lead to decisions that undermine the standardization process.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent (SEP) Disputes"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
David L. Newman
Source: Journal of Dispute Resolution, Forthcoming
Publication Date: October 2 2013
Date Added: November 12 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: A growing chorus of voices is calling for the use of arbitration to resolve disputes concerning standards-essential patents (SEPs). Those advocating the arbitration of SEP-related disputes include academic commentators, government officials and members of the professional bar. Most cite the potential savings of cost and time that arbitration could achieve over the multi-year, resource-intensive lawsuits that currently characterize these disputes. But despite these ringing endorsements, there is surprisingly little guidance available for parties, standards-development organizations (SDOs), and tribunals that wish to implement effective arbitration procedures for these complex disputes. In this article, we lay the groundwork for the development of such procedures and identify several key areas in which further study and deliberation will be required. We pay particular attention to fundamental questions such as whether SEP arbitration should be mandated by SDOs, which issues should be arbitrated, whether arbitral decisions should be confidential, and what form arbitration proceedings should take. While, at this early stage, we do not purport to answer these difficult questions in a definitive manner, we offer a framework for further discussion that we hope will be useful for policy makers, industry participants and commentators considering these important issues.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent (SEP) Disputes"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
David L. Newman
Source: Journal of Dispute Resolution, Forthcoming
Publication Date: October 3 2013
Date Added: October 4 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: A growing chorus of voices is calling for the use of arbitration to resolve disputes concerning standards-essential patents (SEPs). Those advocating the arbitration of SEP-related disputes include academic commentators, government officials and members of the professional bar. Most cite the potential savings of cost and time that arbitration could achieve over the multi-year, resource-intensive lawsuits that currently characterize these disputes. But despite these ringing endorsements, there is surprisingly little guidance available for parties, standards-development organizations (SDOs), and tribunals that wish to implement effective arbitration procedures for these complex disputes. In this article, we lay the groundwork for the development of such procedures and identify several key areas in which further study and deliberation will be required. We pay particular attention to fundamental questions such as whether SEP arbitration should be mandated by SDOs, which issues should be arbitrated, whether arbitral decisions should be confidential, and what form arbitration proceedings should take. While, at this early stage, we do not purport to answer these difficult questions in a definitive manner, we offer a framework for further discussion that we hope will be useful for policy makers, industry participants and commentators considering these important issues.
Link: Full Text

Title: "“Umbrella” Standards Bodies: Framing IPR Policies"
Author: Carter Eltzroth
Source: Landslide
Publication Date: August 2013
Date Added: September 27 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The recent launch of a number of umbrella standards groups provides an opportunity to consider how they address intellectual property rights (IPR) associated with their activities. Umbrella standards groups bring together standards development organizations (SDOs) and others to address standards challenges that cut across the work of established SDOs and territories. This article considers three umbrella groups. Future of Broadcast Television (FOBTV) is multiterritory: it is composed of broadcast standards bodies worldwide and other entities; its ambition is to encourage harmonization of standards for next-generation digital terrestrial television. A second umbrella group, oneM2M, develops globally applicable technical specifications and technical reports for the M2M service layer. oneM2M cuts across traditionally distinct industry silos. The third umbrella group, Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), is also a cross-industry body, bringing together a number of SDOs and others involved in the renovation of electricity networks and the application of new technologies. One characteristic of umbrella standards groups is that they generally disclaim any development of standards. Rather, they review and comment on the standards developed by participating SDOs; they identify and often resolve conflicts between standards; and they propose gap fillers where a technical issue is not addressed. Because of their composite nature, umbrella standards groups present unique issues relating to the IPR policy applicable to their activities. In a typical standards body, its policy on IPR governs the availability of patents, owned by SDO participants, that are essential to the implementation of the SDO's standards. It is common, for example, for an IPR policy to require that SDO participants grant licenses to these essential patents on terms that are fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND). Another common requirement is disclosure by the participant of its essential patents. Moreover, SDOs are long familiar with interactions with other bodies, frequently collaborating through liaisons and referring to each other's standards. They have developed a series of practices to resolve the IPR issues that can arise from these interactions. But an umbrella standards group is not a typical SDO. This article examines the twin IPR challenges for the umbrella standards group: It disclaims any work to develop its own standards, but could well have other deliverables whose mandatory nature could have standards-like qualities. What IPR policy should it have to cover these deliverables? (One risk is described in the hypothetical set out below.) The contributions to its work come from a number of independent SDOs, each with its own IPR policy. What kind of recognition should the umbrella group give to these policies? This article examines in turn the IPR policies adopted by FOBTV, oneM2M, and SGIP.
Link: Full Text

Title: "How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of Frand Bargaining"
Author: Dorsey Elyse
Publication Date: April 16 2013
Date Added: June 24 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") recently closed its investigation of Google, following a thorough analysis of numerous aspects of Google's business conduct. The Proposed Consent Order into which the FTC and Google tentatively entered has garnered significant attention from the antitrust and intellectual property communities for a number of reasons. One important reason is that the Proposed Consent Order places serious limits upon Google's ability to seek injunctive relief for its patents that are considered "standard-essential" and that are subject to fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") commitments. This limitation reflects the emerging tendency of competition agencies to consider the threat or pursuit of injunctive relief a serious competitive concern when the patent at issue is standard essential and the patent holder previously agreed to license that patent on FRAND terms. Indeed, the issue of whether, and if so, under what circumstances, standard essential patent ("SEP") holders should be allowed to seek, and courts should grant, injunctive relief in cases involving FRAND bargaining has been the topic of considerable debate amongst intellectual property and antitrust scholars, as well. With the closing of its Google investigation, the FTC has joined the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") in issuing official statements indicating that owners of SEPs who have agreed to bargain on FRAND terms may be subject to investigations and penalties simply for seeking an injunction against a member of the standard setting organization ("SSO"). This new approach portends a significant shift in the way FRAND negotiations are conducted and in the outcomes they produce. The goal of this Essay is to raise some concerns regarding this issue, and, in particular, to focus upon the potential consumer welfare effects of essentially removing the possibility of injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Part I of this Essay describes SSOs and FRAND bargaining, highlighting the potential competitive benefits and pitfalls - most notably, patent holdup - associated with them. Part II articulates the developing approaches the FTC and DOJ have taken toward the possibility of injunctive relief for SEP holders subject to FRAND commitments, noting both how these approaches have evolved over the last few years and the most recent official decisions by each agency. Part III then analyzes the desirability of these approaches; it examines the limited available evidence regarding the extent of patent holdup in FRAND negotiations, how the agencies' latest approach seemingly departs from the traditional patent law approach to remedies, and how the unintended consequences of disallowing injunctive relief in these cases may negatively affect consumer welfare. Part IV concludes.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Multilingual access to cultural heritage content on the SemanticWeb"
Author: Maria Mateva
Publication Date: May 30 2013
Date Added: May 30 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: As the amount of cultural data available on the SemanticWeb is expanding, the demand of accessing this data in multiple languages is increasing. Previous work on multilingual access to cultural heritage information has shown that mapping from ontologies to natural language requires at least two different steps: (1) mapping multilingual metadata to interoperable knowledge sources; (2) assigning multilingual knowledge to cultural data. This paper presents our work on making cultural heritage content available on the Semantic Web and accessible in 15 languages. The objective of our work is both to form queries and to retrieve semantic content in multiple languages. We describe our experiences with processing museum data extracted from two different sources, harmonizing this data and making its content accessible in natural language.
Link: Full Text

Title: "America's Voluntary Standards System: A 'Best Practice' Model for Asian Innovation Policies?"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Publication Date: April 1 2013
Date Added: May 28 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Across Asia there is a keen interest in the potential advantages of America's market-led system of voluntary standards and its contribution to US innovation leadership in complex technologies. For its proponents, the US tradition of bottom-up, decentralized, informal, market-led standardization is a "best practice" model for innovation policy. Observers in Asia are, however, concerned about possible drawbacks of a standards system largely driven by the private sector. This study reviews the historical roots of the American system, examines its defining characteristics, and highlights its strengths and weaknesses. A tradition of decentralized local self-government has given voice to diverse stakeholders in innovation. However, a lack of effective coordination of multiple stakeholder strategies constrains effective and open standardization processes. Asian countries seeking to improve their standards systems should study the strengths and weaknesses of the American system. Attempts to replicate the US standards system will face clear limitations--persistent differences in Asia's economic institutions, levels of development, and growth models are bound to limit convergence to a US-style market-led voluntary standards system.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Indigenous Innovation and Globalization, the Challenge for China's Standardization Strategy"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Publication Date: June 1 2011
Date Added: May 28 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The study examines defining characteristics of the evolving Chinese innovation and standards system and explores possible impacts for China as well as the global economy. China considers standardization to be an essential tool for improving its innovative capacity, yet very little is known about this critical building block of China's innovation system.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Toward Greater Pragmatism? China’s Approach to Innovation and Standardization"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Publication Date: August 1 2011
Date Added: May 28 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: China's innovation policy and its perceived threat to American innovation and competitiveness is a hot topic in U.S.-China economic relations. The role of standardization, together with intellectual property rights and government procurement, are at the center of this conflict. Fundamental differences in their levels of development and economic institutions lead to quite different approaches to standards and innovation policy by the two countries. China's strategy of pursuing indigenous innovation based on local standards faces internal challenges in trying to bring together a diverse group of stakeholders with conflicting interests, as well as external pressures to adopt international standards. Enhanced cooperation on standards and innovation policies should be possible, once the United States and China accept that, while their economic and innovation systems are different, they are deeply interdependent. Both sides would benefit, creating new Chinese markets for American firms and easing technology licensing restrictions for Chinese firms.
Link: Full Text

Title: "New Dimensions to the Patent Holdup Saga"
Author: Michael Lindsay
Robert Skitol
Publication Date: April 1 2013
Date Added: May 24 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: When SSO's consider protections for implementers, they must also consider costs to patent holders and incentives to patent holders and implementers to participate in standards development. Each of the six Hesse suggestions would impose burdens on patent holders, and in some instances the combination of those burdens might be enough to discourage patent holder participation in standards development. Moreover, some of these proposals might require significant funding, and an SSO must consider business models that would generate the funds without jeopardizing the SSO's basic standards development mission. On the other hand, thoughtful implementation of some, if not all, of these suggestions should mitigate the rising concern at both antitrust agencies about patent holdup relating to standards development activities; and that mitigation should be beneficial to patent-owning SSO participants.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing"
Author: Jorge Contreras
Publication Date: March 13 2013
Date Added: May 24 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Technical interoperability standards are critical elements of mobile telephones, laptop computers, digital files, and thousands of other products in the modern networked economy. Most such standards are developed in so-called voluntary standards-development organizations (SDOs) that require participants to license patents essential to the standard on terms that are "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND). FRAND commitments are thought to avoid the problem of patent hold-up: the imposition of excessive royalty demands after a standard has been widely adopted in the market. While, at first blush, FRAND commitments seem to assure product vendors that patents will not obstruct the manufacture and sale of standards-compliant products, in reality these commitments are vague and unreliable. Moreover, they have proven ineffective to address the problem of patent stacking, which occurs when multiple patent holders assert rights in, and demand royalties on, the same standard. The recent surge of litigation in the smart phone and other technology sectors, much of which concerns the interpretation and enforcement of FRAND commitments, has brought these issues to the attention of regulators, industry, and the public, and many agree that a better approach to FRAND is needed. In this paper, I propose a novel solution to the SDO FRAND problem that borrows from the related field of patent pools. In patent pools, multiple patent holders agree to charge a single, collective royalty on patents included in the pool. This structure, which has been utilized in connection with several successful industry standards, allows market participants to manufacture and sell standards-compliant products with a high degree of certainty regarding their aggregate royalty burden. While the cost and administrative overhead of patent pools may make them inapposite for the majority of standards developed in the SDO setting, salient features of pools can be adapted for use in SDOs under what I term a "pseudo-pool" approach. The pseudo-pool approach includes the following principal elements: (a) SDO participants must declare patents in good faith, (b) SDO working groups that include patent holders and potential vendors are encouraged to establish aggregate royalty rates for standards, (c) patent holders continue to grant licenses on FRAND terms, subject to the aggregate royalty agreement, (d) each patent holder is entitled to a share of the aggregate royalty based on a proportionality measure, (e) there is a defined penalty for over-declaration of patents, (f) each patent holder is permitted to license its patents independently of the pseudo-pooling arrangement, and (g) patent holders can opt out of the collective royalty structure if they so choose. This proposal encourages joint negotiation of royalty rates prior to lock-in of a standard, conduct that has been viewed with approval by several regulatory agencies and acknowledged as offering various procompetitive benefits. It is hoped that the proposed structure will eliminate the current uncertainty surrounding royalty levels on standardized products, while at the same time addressing the related issue of patent royalty stacking.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Standards-Essential Patents and Injunctive Relief"
Author: Jones Day Publishing
Publication Date: April 1 2013
Date Added: April 26 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: In a series of fast-moving and interrelated developments involving courts and competition authorities in many regions and countries, holders of patents deemed "essential" to industry standards are finding their ability to obtain injunctive relief for infringement of those patents under challenge. Traditionally, in most significant jurisdictions around the world, the plaintiff in a patent infringement action can seek an injunction preventing the accused infringer from continuing to practice the inventions claimed in the patent, as well as monetary damages in the form of lost profits or a reasonable royalty.
Link: Full Text

Title: "A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents"
Author: Lemley Mark
Carl Shapiro
Publication Date: March 30 2013
Date Added: April 26 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) typically require their members to license any standard-essential patent on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Unfortunately, numerous high-stakes disputes have recently broken out over just what these "FRAND commitments" mean and how and where to enforce them. We propose a simple, practical set of rules regarding patents that SSOs can adopt to achieve the goals of FRAND commitments far more efficiently with far less litigation. Under our proposed approach, if an standard-essential patent owner and an implementer of the standard cannot agree on licensing terms, the standard-essential patent owner is obligated to enter into binding baseball-style (or "final offer") arbitration with any willing licensee to determine the royalty rate. This obligation may be conditioned on the implementer making a reciprocal FRAND Commitment for any standard-essential patents it owns that read on the same standard. If the implementer is unwilling to enter into binding arbitration, the standard-essential patent owner's FRAND commitment not to go to court to enforce its standard-essential patents against that party is discharged. We explain how our proposed FRAND regime would work in practice. Many of the disputes currently arising around FRAND commitments become moot under our approach.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Private Standards Organizations and Public Law"
Author: Peter Strauss
Publication Date: December 27 2012
Date Added: April 26 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Simplified, universal access to law is one of the important transformations worked by the digital age. With the replacement of physical by digital copies, citizens ordinarily need travel only to the nearest computer to find and read the texts that bind them. Lagging behind this development, however, has been computer access to standards developed by private standards development organizations, often under the umbrella of the American National Standards Institute, and then converted by agency actions incorporating them by reference into legal obligations. To discover what colors OSHA requires for use in workplace caution signs, one must purchase from ANSI the standard OSHA has referenced in its regulations, at the price ANSI chooses to charge for it. The regulations governing incorporation by reference as a federal matter have not been revised since 1982, and so do not address the changes the digital age has brought about in what it means for incorporated matter to be "reasonably available," as 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) requires. This essay seeks to bridge that gap, suggesting a variety of approaches that might bring the use of incorporation by reference into conformity with modern rulemaking practices and respect the general proposition that documents stating citizens' legal obligations are not subject to copyright, while at the same time both honoring clear federal statutory policy favoring the use of privately developed standards in rule making and respecting the needs standards organizations have to find reasonable means to support the costs of their operations. Business models created in the age of print need to change; the challenge is to find ways to permit the market in privately developed voluntary standards to thrive, without thereby permitting the monopoly pricing of access to governing law.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Standardization: A Dynamic and Procedural Conceptualization of International Law-Making"
Author: Yannick Radi
Publication Date: June 1 2012
Date Added: April 26 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The paper analyses the dynamic procedures which work at the formation of international law in international organizations and conventional frameworks. These procedures organize and structure the interactive exercise of the normative function by law-creating bodies and law-applying bodies. The paper conceives of this 'way' of making international law as a law-making method that the concept of standardization helps to understand. Grounded in Aristotelian dialectic logic, standardization indeed conceptualizes the dialogic and procedural law-making which works for normative coherence in contexts characterized by cooperation and the heterogeneity of interests. Introducing this concept, the paper insists on the fact that it is the procedural nature of the dialogue which is crucial to reach normative coherence. Drawing the consequences of standardization, and regarding dynamic procedures, it reappraises the status and the importance of both the different sources of international law and the different participants to international law-making. Besides, the paper points out the predominance of normative coherence as well as of its 'guarantor', i.e. procedure that its author considers as the cornerstone of legal certainty in the cooperative context of the international society.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks: The Role of Technical Standards"
Author: Jane Winn
Publication Date: December 31 2012
Date Added: April 26 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Mobile money has the potential to be an effective policy instrument for financial inclusion in developing countries, but it also has the potential to fuel money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2012 revised Financial Action Task Force standards attempt to strike a workable balance between the goals of financial inclusion and financial integrity in developing countries. Mobile money schemes are mostly based in national markets, however, and are not normally designed to address the need of poor migrants for cheap, effective cross-border remittance services. Demand for such cross-border remittance services may drive the development of technical standards to build global markets from national ones. As in other global governance contexts, regulatory competition among both developed and developing countries is likely to arise, and be shaped by network externalities, the economics of platform markets, and new governance institutions as well as national government strategies. If such standard setting efforts treat compliance with AML/CTF as requirements, then the growth of global networks might promote both inclusion and the development of "integrity by design" in global mobile money technologies. Co-regulatory mechanisms already in place in the US and EU for managing the interface between technical standards and legislation might provide some helpful models for accomplishing this. Ensuring that the governance of global mobile money networks is effective, legitimate, and accountable from the perspective of stakeholders in both developed and developing economies will be difficult, however.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Standardization: A Dynamic and Procedural Conceptualization of International Law-Making"
Author: Yannick Radi
Publication Date: June 1 2012
Date Added: March 6 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The paper analyses the dynamic procedures which work at the formation of international law in international organizations and conventional frameworks. These procedures organize and structure the interactive exercise of the normative function by law-creating bodies and law-applying bodies. The paper conceives of this 'way' of making international law as a law-making method that the concept of standardization helps to understand. Grounded in Aristotelian dialectic logic, standardization indeed conceptualizes the dialogic and procedural law-making which works for normative coherence in contexts characterized by cooperation and the heterogeneity of interests. Introducing this concept, the paper insists on the fact that it is the procedural nature of the dialogue which is crucial to reach normative coherence. Drawing the consequences of standardization, and regarding dynamic procedures, it reappraises the status and the importance of both the different sources of international law and the different participants to international law-making. Besides, the paper points out the predominance of normative coherence as well as of its 'guarantor', i.e. procedure that its author considers as the cornerstone of legal certainty in the cooperative context of the international society.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks: The Role of Technical Standards"
Author: Jane Winn
Publication Date: December 31 2012
Date Added: March 6 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Mobile money has the potential to be an effective policy instrument for financial inclusion in developing countries, but it also has the potential to fuel money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2012 revised Financial Action Task Force standards attempt to strike a workable balance between the goals of financial inclusion and financial integrity in developing countries. Mobile money schemes are mostly based in national markets, however, and are not normally designed to address the need of poor migrants for cheap, effective cross-border remittance services. Demand for such cross-border remittance services may drive the development of technical standards to build global markets from national ones. As in other global governance contexts, regulatory competition among both developed and developing countries is likely to arise, and be shaped by network externalities, the economics of platform markets, and new governance institutions as well as national government strategies. If such standard setting efforts treat compliance with AML/CTF as requirements, then the growth of global networks might promote both inclusion and the development of "integrity by design" in global mobile money technologies. Co-regulatory mechanisms already in place in the US and EU for managing the interface between technical standards and legislation might provide some helpful models for accomplishing this. Ensuring that the governance of global mobile money networks is effective, legitimate, and accountable from the perspective of stakeholders in both developed and developing economies will be difficult, however.
Link: Full Text

Title: "The Rise of China in Technology Standards:New Norms in Old Institutions"
Author: Dan Breznitz
Michael Murphree
Publication Date: January 16 2013
Date Added: January 25 2013
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: China's efforts to develop unique technology standards and its rapidly increasing activities as a participant in international standardization efforts have drawn widespread attention. China does use technology standards as a protectionist tool. However, a complete review of the standardization system reveals that: i) protectionism is not the major focus of Chinese standards development efforts; and ii) it is not the main challenge China poses for American firms. This report addresses six broad areas of interest that are critical to understanding Chinese technology standards efforts and their implications: - Unique or exclusionary technology standards have neither been commercially successful nor fully exclusionary - Unique standards efforts are an effective trade tool, particularly in lowering royalty rates for Chinese firms - The main challenge China poses in standardization is in establishing new norms, particularly advancement of a cheap royalty options to the holders of standards-essential Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) - China is rapidly increasing its skill and sophistication in global standards organizations and building deep knowledge of their regulations, fostering potential advantages in negotiations - Technology standardization in China remains legally governed by laws and administrative apparatus developed for, and at the time of, the planned economy - An expansive role for the state in standardization is the accepted norm in China.
Link: Full Text

Title: "The Next Innovation Revolution -"
Author: James Turner
Publication Date: June 9 2006
Date Added: December 7 2012
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Nations seem most open to economic innovation when they feel threatened. In the late 1970s the United States experienced this: slipping competitive position compared to Japan convinced policy-makers that strategic adjustments to compete were necessary. In 1979, President Carter's Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation (DPR) provided a road map for optimizing U.S. society for innovation and for responding to Japan's industrial policy.While the DPR benefited from earlier studies, it proved to be the right study at the right time. It championed cooperation among industry, universities, and the government, then a fresh idea, and promoted cooperative research among U.S. companies. And it systematically examined federal policies to see what changes in law and administration policy were needed to permit American researchers from all sectors to work together. The resulting changes were neither entirely new ideas nor immediate, and innovation policy had different emphases in each successive presidential administration. But, looking back, it is clear that the DPR proposals led to revolutionary changes, both within companies and in the ways they relate to other companies and universities - and thus provided the nation with a significant competitive advantage. But that advantage was temporary. Today, twenty-five years later, many in the United States again feel threatened by international competition.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Openness and Legitimacy in Standards Development"
Author: Andrew Updegrove
Publication Date: November 30 2012
Date Added: November 30 2012
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Consensus regarding which specifications can rightfully claim to be 'open standards' has been notably difficult to achieve in recent times. Usually, the question is academic, but when governments restrict their very substantial purchasing power to the acquisition of products and services implementing only such standards, then the selection of openness criteria can become contentious. In this article, I review the norms of openness observed by traditional SDOs and modern consortia in light of their standards-related goals, and traditional as well as cutting edge definitions of openness to be found in a variety of modern national government, international treaty, and private sector settings.
Link: Full Text