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Title: "What You Need to Know About Standard Essential Patents"
Author: Michael A. Carrier
Source: Competition Policy International (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2014)
Publication Date: August 25 2014
Date Added: December 23 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: In the past several years, standard essential patents, or "SEPs," have exploded onto the scene. Courts and enforcement agencies around the world have grappled with the nuances they present. What exactly are SEPs? What do attorneys need to know about SEPs? This article answers these questions. After presenting the setting in which SEPs arise, it addresses three issues: (1) injunctions; (2) antitrust enforcement (in the US, EU, China, India, and Germany); and (3) the determination of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") royalties.
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Title: "Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust In Regulating Incomplete Contracts"
Author: Joanna Tsai
Joshua D. Wright
Source: 80 Antitrust Law Journal No. 1 (2015)
Publication Date: October 2015
Date Added: November 4 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: In this article, written with Joshua D. Wright, Joanna Tsai documents and analyzes changes to 11 SSO IPR policies over time and show that SSOs and their IPR policies appear to be responsive to changes in perceived patent holdup risks and other factors.
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Title: "Technology Standards and Standards Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database"
Author: Justus Baron
Danie. F. Spulber
Publication Date: September 8 2015
Date Added: November 4 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This article describes the Searle Center Database on Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations (SSO). This is the first large scale database with information on technology standards, SSO membership and SSO characteristics that is designed for economic research. In particular, the database includes data on quantifiable characteristics of 629,438 standard documents issued by 598 SSOs, institutional membership in a sample of 195 SSOs, and the rules of 36 SSOs on standard-essential patents (SEPs), openness, participation and standard adoption procedures. Using the Internet Archives, the database tracks both institutional membership and the SSO rules and procedures over time since the inception of the Archives in 1996. We identify more than 62,368 firms and other organizations participating in at least one SSO. The paper describes how to combine this data with other new databases and sketches avenues for empirical research
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Title: "Royalty Rates And Licensing Strategies For Essential Patents On LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards"
Author: Erik Stasik
Publication Date: September 2010
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Long Term Evolution, or LTE, is the latest sequel to the successful GSM series of standards. A so called fourth generation (4G) mobile communications technology, LTE is an upgrade to UMTS/WCDMA (3G) providing an enhanced radio interface and all-IP networking technology. Like a sequel to a successful movie, LTE includes many elements of the original release and offers a few new twists. This is especially true when it comes to the matter of licensing essential IPRs for the LTE standard. Audiences can expect to see the same licensing challenges that first appeared in GSM (2G) and which re-appeared in UMTS (3G) starring again in LTE (4G).2 The plot is essentially the same: lots of essential patents and many different patent holders. The LTE sequel begins in much the same way as UMTS did-with an announcement of an industry initiative on the matter of essential IPRs. In LTE this scene took place in April 2008 where a group of leading telecommunication companies committed themselves to a framework for 'establishing predictable and more transparent maximum aggregate costs for licensing [patents] that relate to 3GPP Long Term Evolution and Service Architecture Evolution (LTE/SAE) standards.' In particular, these companies stated 'support' for 'a reasonable maximum aggregate royalty for LTE essential IPR in handsets is a single-digit percentage of the sales price.'
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Title: "Smartphone Revolution: Technology patenting and licensing fosters innovation, market entry, and exceptional growth"
Author: K. Mallinson
Source: Consumer Electronics Magazine, IEEE (Volume:4 , Issue: 2 )
Publication Date: April 2015
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: It is remarkable how dramatically and rapidly the fortunes of so many mobile-handset vendors have turned with the advance of smartphones. Their marketplace was transformed by Apple?s iPhone starting in 2007 and a succession of Android-based smartphone newcomers since 2008. This has greatly expanded the size of the handset market, with global revenues doubling in the last six years, as consumers substitute more expensive smartphones for their feature phones and basic phones. Yet, the changes have devastated most of the leading incumbent handset vendors.
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Title: "Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts"
Author: Anne Layne-Farrar
Gerard Llobet
Jorge Padilla
Source: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 23, Issue 1, pages 24-49, Spring 2014
Publication Date: January 7 2014
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Formal, cooperative standard setting continues to grow in importance for the global economy. And as standards become more pervasive, the stakes rise for all participants. It is not surprising then that many standards are covered by intellectual property rights, that battles over the licensing of those rights have reached a fevered pitch in several industries, and that competition agencies around the globe are seriously weighing whether and how to intervene in the standard setting process. One suggestion for such an intervention is the imposition of a licensing cap, referred to as the incremental value rule. We evaluate this proposal and find that even in contexts where this rule is efficient from an ex-post point of view, it induces important distortions in the decisions of firms to innovate and participate in standard setting organizations (SSO). Such a rule reduces the R&D investment that a firm makes in relevant technologies and lowers the probability that it will join the SSO. We characterize a variation of the incremental value rule for defining fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory that accounts for both investment and participation incentives.
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Title: "Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions"
Author: Dietmar Harhoff
Francis Narin
F. M. Scherer
Katrin Vopel
Source: The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 81, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 511-515
Publication Date: August 1999
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Through a survey, private economic value estimates were obtained on 964 inventions made in the United States and Germany and on which German patent renewal fees were paid to full-term expiration in 1995. A search of subsequent U.S. and German patents yielded counts of citations to those patents. Patents renewed to full-term were significantly more highly cited than patents allowed to expire before their full term. The higher an invention's economic value estimate was, the more the patent was subsequently cited.
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Title: "THE PATENT POLICY DEBATE IN THE HIGH-TECH WORLD"
Author: Kirti Gupta
Source: Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2013) 9 (4): 827-858
Publication Date: January 2013
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Increases in patent awards and the growing economic importance of innovation have generated a debate among academics and public policy makers about the fundamental nature of the patent system. The debate raises questions regarding the fairness of the patent system, the validity of many types of patents, the rights of the "haves" versus the "have nots," and whether patents are fostering or harming innovation. The debate focuses on a handful of issues: are there too many patents, are there non-navigable "patent thickets," do these thickets cause a "holdup" problem for new innovators and implementers, do the royalties that need to be paid for several patents covering a single product stack together to form prohibitive royalty rates, how should reasonable licensing terms and damages for patents be defined, and so forth. This article examines the economic literature on patent policy with particular consideration of empirical analysis. The article finds limited empirical support for many of the policy concerns about the patent system. The discussion suggests the need for extending and improving empirical analysis of patents and technology standards.
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Title: "An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up"
Author: Alexander Galetovic
Stephen Haber
Ross Levine
Source: NBER Working Paper No. 21090
Publication Date: April 2015
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to "hold up" innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP hold-up hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.
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Title: "IP Squared: Internet Standards and Intellectual Property"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
Wilmer Hale
Source: IEEE Internet Computing, Issue No.06 - November/December (2008 vol.12) pp: 83-86
Publication Date: November 2008
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Standards-development organizations (SDOs) comprise participants from large and small companies, academia, and the open source community. The participants come with varying backgrounds with regard to copyright and patents in the areas that are being standardized, and the SDOs must deal with these issues in ways that both satisfy the participants (and their employers) and result in useful standards. Each SDO - including the IEEE - has its own intellectual property (IP) policy. This issue, we look at how the IETF handles IP, in an overview cowritten by an attorney who has represented the IETF for some years and the current IETF Chair.
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Title: "Divergent patterns of engagement in Internet standardization: Japan, Korea and China"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
Source: Telecommunications Policy Volume 38, Issue 10, November 2014, Pages 914-932
Publication Date: November 2014
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: This article analyzes the engagement of Japanese, Korean and Chinese participants in the development of Internet standards at IETF on the basis of four quantitative metrics: attendance, patenting, authorship and leadership. The results are strikingly divergent. Japanese involvement in Internet standardization began early and Japan was, for many years, second only to the U.S. in terms of IETF participation. Though Japanese participation has declined since the early 2000s, Japan remains a major contributor to IETF standardization. Korean involvement in IETF has always been significant, but below the levels of Japan and major European countries. Korean participation in IETF has also declined over the past decade, and has been dominated by one firm, Samsung. Though meaningful Chinese involvement in IETF did not begin until the mid-2000s, it has rapidly expanded in recent years. Today, China is a major player in numerous areas of Internet standardization in terms of three metrics (participation, patenting and leadership), and is rapidly gaining in terms of document authorship as well. Most of China׳s recent IETF involvement can be attributed to Huawei, though other Chinese firms have recently begun to increase their participation in the organization. Thus, contrary to some views that China׳s engagement with standardization is primarily one of indigenous innovation and "catching up", China׳s experience with IETF demonstrates deliberate and effective engagement with a major Western standards-development organization on its own terms.
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Title: "Royalty-Free Video Coding Standards in MPEG [Standards in a Nutshell]"
Author: K. Choi
E. Jang
Source: Signal Processing Magazine, IEEE (Volume:31 , Issue: 1
Publication Date: January 2014
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: On 7 March 2013, the Moving Picture Experts Group Licensing Association (MPEG LA) and Google announced that they have entered into an agreement granting Google a license to techniques, if the patents in MPEG LA might be essential to VP8. Under this agreement, hardware and software companies are free to use the VP8 technology when developing their own products. Considering that it is now common to find patent disputes in headline news, the patent issues related to video coding standards are no exception. In this article, we report on the recent developments in royalty-free codec standardization in MPEG, particularly Internet video coding (IVC), Web video coding (WVC), and video coding for browser, by reviewing the history of royalty-free standards in MPEG and the relationship between standards and patents.
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Title: "INJUNCTIONS FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS: JUSTICE IS NOT BLIND"
Author: Peter Camesasca
Gregor Langus
Damien Neven
Pat Treacy
Source: Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2013) 9 (2): 285-311
Publication Date: May 29 2013
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This article aims to contribute to the debate on the merit of the availability of injunctions for SEPs. We address the perception that the current system contains inadequate protection for licensees against the risk of hold up on the part of SEP owners through the application for injunctions. We provide an overview of court procedures currently in place across key jurisdictions and argue that the risk of hold up is overstated and that serious consideration should be given in the policy debate to the risk of reverse hold up by the licensees before contemplating change. Importantly, our analysis takes into account the possibility of opportunistic behavior by prospective licensees. This feature has been noted before but not explicitly modeled so far.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Interrelation between patenting and standardisation strategies: empirical evidence and policy implications"
Author: Knut Blind
Nikolaus Thumm
Source: Research Policy Volume 33, Issue 10, December 2004, Pages 1583-1598
Publication Date: December 2004
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between strategies to protect intellectual property rights and their impact on the likelihood of joining formal standardisation processes. It is based on a small sample of European companies. On the one hand, theory suggests that the stronger the protection of own technological know-how, the higher the likelihood to join formal standardisation processes in order to leverage the value of the technological portfolio. On the other hand, companies at the leading edge are often in such a strong position that they do not need the support of standards to market their products successfully. The results of the Probit models to explain the likelihood to join standardisation processes support the latter theoretical hypothesis: the higher the patent intensities of companies, the lower is their tendency to join standardisation processes.
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Title: "An economic analysis of standards competition: The example of the ISO ODF and OOXML standards"
Author: Knut Blind
Source: Telecommunications Policy Volume 35, Issue 4, May 2011, Pages 373-381
Publication Date: May 2011
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze economic efficiency considerations of standards competition, in order to thereby enrich the discussion about the transfer of the ECMA-376-1 (Office Open XML - OOXML) standard into the ISO/IEC 29500:2008 standard parallel to the already existing ISO/IEC 26300:2006 (Open Document Format for Office Applications - ODF) standard. Based on the available economic literature we identify parameters that need to be considered in the decision for or against a competition between competing standards. The characteristics in the specific case of competition between the ODF and the OOOXML standard clearly justify the decision for two documents standards.
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Title: "An empirical study on the determinants of essential patent claims in compatibility standards"
Author: Rudi Bekkers
Rene Bongard
Alessandro Nuvolari
Source: Research Policy Volume 40, Issue 7, September 2011, Pages 1001-1015
Publication Date: September 2011
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: n the field of compatibility standards, an increasing number of companies claim to own so-called essential patents (i.e. those patents that are indispensable for designing and manufacturing products conforming to the standard). It is widely believed that the ownership of such patents is a very valuable bargaining tool in cross-license negotiations, while for non-producing firms such patents may result in a substantial stream of licensing revenues. In this paper we study the determinants of essential patent claims in compatibility standards. In particular, we assess the role of two main factors: the significance of the technological solution contained in the patent and the involvement of the applicant of the patent in the standardisation process. We examine the case of W-CDMA, one of the most successful standards in mobile telecommunications. We compare the patents claimed essential for this standard with a control group of randomly selected, unclaimed patents covering the same time period and technology classes. We find empirical evidence that both factors have significant impact on the probability that a patent is claimed as essential, but the involvement in the standardisation process is a stronger determinant than the technical value ('merit') of the patent. On the basis of our findings, we offer policy recommendations.
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Title: "WHO COOPERATES IN STANDARDS CONSORTIA - RIVALS OR COMPLEMENTORS?"
Author: Justus Baron
Tim Pohlmann
Source: Jnl of Competition Law & Economics (2013) 9 (4): 905-929
Publication Date: November 13 2013
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Formal standard development is increasingly supplemented by standards consortia: informal and less inclusive alliances, in which firms coordinate standard-related research and development ("R&D") and streamline standard development. In order to cast light on the economic function of these consortia, this article provides empirical evidence on the standards related to informal consortia, and on the R&D contributions of members and outsiders. We find that standards related to consortia are characterized by a more fragmented ownership of intellectual property rights ("IPR") and a strong degree of technological rivalry. We also find that among the firms contributing to a standard, technological specialists are less likely to be member of a consortium. Companies are more likely to be members of the same consortium with companies specializing in R&D that is substitutable rather than complementary to their own patent portfolio. One possible interpretation of these findings is that a main benefit of standards consortia is to reduce the cost of standard development by eliminating wasteful R&D duplication and settling conflicts of interest upfront to formal standardization.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Committee Composition and Networking in Standard Setting: The Case of Wireless Telecommunications"
Author: Talia Bar
Aija Leiponen
Source: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 23, Issue 1, pages 1-23, Spring 2014
Publication Date: January 7 2014
Date Added: September 9 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: We examine factors behind firms' decisions to contribute to open standard setting. Our study highlights a novel explanation: firms seek to improve their positions in an interfirm cooperation network. In the wireless telecommunications standard-setting organization we study, firms develop new technical specifications in small committees. Our panel data analyses demonstrate that interorganizational network connections influence firms' decisions to support committees. Additionally, firms are more likely to support committees when they are technologically distant from the firm that initiated the committee. We argue that standard setting presents opportunities for information exchange and for accessing complementary R&D assets through the cooperation network.
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Title: "Patents, Technical Standards and Standards-Setting Organizations: A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature"
Author: Jorge L. Contreras
Source: Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law - Vol. 2: Analytical Methods (Peter Menell and David L. Schwartz, Eds.) (Edward Elgar)
Publication Date: August 9 2015
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Despite their potential efficiency benefits, voluntary consensus standards have over the past decade become the subject of significant private litigation, regulatory enforcement and policy debate. Much of the controversy centers on the perceived proliferation of patents covering standardized technologies, potentially abusive enforcement of such patents against manufacturers and users of standardized products, and the terms on which patent holders may be required to license the use of those patents to others. This chapter offers a brief overview of the legal and economic literature concerning interoperability standards and standards-setting organizations, with a focus on empirical studies and contemporary patent and patent licensing concerns.
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Title: "Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts"
Author: Joanna Tsai
Joshua D. Wright
Source: Antitrust Law Journal (2015)
Publication Date: July 18 2014
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: A large and growing number of regulators and academics, while recognizing the benefits of standardization, view skeptically the role standard setting organizations (SSOs) play in facilitating standardization and commercialization of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Competition agencies and commentators suggest specific changes to current SSO IPR policies to reduce incompleteness and favor an expanded role for antitrust law in deterring patent holdup. These criticisms and policy proposals are based upon the premise that the incompleteness of SSO contracts is inefficient and the result of market failure rather than an efficient outcome reflecting the costs and benefits of adding greater specificity to SSO contracts and emerging from a competitive contracting environment. We explore conceptually and empirically that presumption. We also document and analyze changes to eleven SSO IPR policies over time. We find that SSOs and their IPR policies appear to be responsive to changes in perceived patent holdup risks and other factors. We find the SSOs' responses to these changes are varied across SSOs, and that contractual incompleteness and ambiguity for certain terms persist both across SSOs and over time, despite many revisions and improvements to IPR policies. We interpret this evidence as consistent with a competitive contracting process. We conclude by exploring the implications of these findings for identifying the appropriate role of antitrust law in governing ex post opportunism in the SSO setting.
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Title: "A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations"
Author: Manuel Trajtenberg
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 172-187
Publication Date: March 1990
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The use of patents in economic research has been seriously hindered by the fact that patents vary enormously in their importance or value, and hence, simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output. The purpose of this article is to put forward patent counts weighted by citations as indicators of the value of innovations, thereby overcoming the limitations of simple counts. The empirical analysis of a particular innovation (Computed Tomography scanners) indeed shows a close association between citation-based patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovations in that field. Moreover, the weighting scheme appears to be nonlinear (increasing) in the number of citations, implying that the informational content of citations rises at the margin. As in previous studies, simple patent counts are found to be highly correlated with contemporaneous R&D; however, here the association is within a field over time rather than cross-sectional.
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Title: "Bringing Standards to Life: Synthetic Biology Standards and Intellectual Property"
Author: Andrew W. Torrance
Linda J. Kahl
Source: Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2014
Publication Date: January 2014
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: In aspiring to become a true engineering discipline for the biological sciences, the field of synthetic biology has a unique opportunity to create and encourage the widespread adoption of standards to enhance innovation and social impact in the field. This article presents a study of the standards setting efforts by the institutions, firms, governments, and individuals within the field of synthetic biology. Numerous standards have been proposed in synthetic biology, including those relevant to structure, function, description, measurement, data, information exchange, software, biosafety and biosecurity, and even law. At the present time, the adoption of technical standards has been relatively modest and no one technical standard appears to have dominated the field. Standards covering policies in biosecurity, by comparison, are more firmly established and biosecurity practices governing commercial orders for synthetic DNA have been widely adopted. Among standards-setting groups within the synthetic biology community, most have expressed a preference that standards remain open and accessible to the community as a whole. Recent developments, including the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in AMP v. Myriad and the Leahy-Smith America's Invents Act, could help give greater clarity to the scope of patent rights covering innovations and standards in synthetic biology. Copyright and trademark may provide alternatives mechanisms for conferring rights in synthetic biology inventions, setting and reinforcing standards, or promoting open innovation.
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Title: "REASONABLE AND NONDISCRIMINATORY (RAND) ROYALTIES, STANDARDS SELECTION, AND CONTROL OF MARKET POWER"
Author: Daniel G. Swanson
William J. Baumol
Source: Antitrust Law Journal Vol. 73, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-58
Publication Date: January 2005
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract:
Link: Full Text

Title: "Are You Still in? - The Impact of Licensing Requirements on the Composition of Standards Setting Organizations"
Author: Thimo Pascal Stoll
Source: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-18
Publication Date: December 8 2014
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Opportunistic behavior such as hold-up by owners of standard-essential patents increasingly affects standardization processes as well as the implementation of standards. The vague fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing requirement applied in the majority of standards setting organizations (SSOs) only mitigates hold-up in the rare case of categorical refusal to license. In recent years, public authorities and some SSOs have therefore intensified their efforts to promote royalty-free (RF) standards. While this approach definitely contributes to a faster standards development process and eventually faster implementation, certain important contributors might decide to leave an SSO or not to join in the first place if they have to forego any licensing revenues from standard-essential patents. To analyze the substitutability of the two licensing regimes, this paper assesses the impact of the IP policy change at the SSO OASIS in April 2005. Based on a unique dataset, a survival analysis finds that the change from a FRAND to a RF licensing regime is correlated with a significant decrease in the overall number of new SSO members. Second, among the new members the share of non-profit research organizations and systems integrators significantly increases in the aftermath of the change. Third, the change has a positive impact on the duration for which the producers of physical goods remain at OASIS. The analysis suggests that SSOs and public authorities have to consider important trade-offs regarding static versus dynamic efficiency when considering to introduce or promote RF licensing requirements.
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Title: "Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting"
Author: Robert A. Skitol
Source: Antitrust Law Journal Vol. 72, No. 2 (2005), pp. 727-744
Publication Date: January 2005
Date Added: September 2 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract:
Link: Full Text