Find out more about this
Gesmer Updegrove has represented more than 125 standards consortia and open source foundations, including:
View Full Client List
Useful Links

Communications Center Press Center Sitemap

Tools

Text Size:
Default  Large

RSS Feeds

Bookmark and Share

Standards <Meta>Library

Newest Additions to the MetaLibrary

To install an automatic RSS alert on your computer, see RSS Feed Intallation.


Title: "Governing the Anticommons: Institutional Design for Standard-Setting Organizations"
Author: Timothy Simcoe
Source: Innovation Policy and the Economy Vol. 14, No. 1 (2014), pp. 99-128
Publication Date: January 2014
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Shared technology platforms are often governed by standard-setting organizations (SSOs), where interested parties use a consensus process to address problems of technical coordination and platform provision. Economists have modeled SSOs as certification agents, bargaining forums, collective licensing arrangements, and research and development (R&D) consortia. This paper integrates these diverse perspectives by adapting Elinor Ostrom's framework for analyzing collective self-governance of shared natural resources to the problem of managing shared technology platforms. There is an inherent symmetry between the natural resource commons problem (overconsumption) and the technology platform anticommons problem (overexclusion), leading to clear parallels in institutional design. Ostrom's eight principles for governing common pool resources illuminate several common SSO practices, and provide useful guidance for resolving ongoing debates over SSO intellectual property rules and procedures.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An Econometric Investigation"
Author: Guifang Yang
Keith Maskus
Source: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Bd. 137, H. 1 (2001), pp. 58-79
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Licensing has been virtually ignored in the econometric literature on intellectual property rights (IPRs). We discuss theoretical effects of IPRs on decisions to license technology internationally. Based on a theoretical model we specify a reduced-form econometric equation relating the volume of U. S. licensing to measures of technology protection and other variables in licensee nations. The model is applied to data for 23 countries in a panel covering 1985, 1990, and 1995. The results indicate that countries with stronger patent rights attract larger arm's-length volumes of licensed technology, though we are unable to distinguish between licensing quantities and values.
Link: Full Text

Title: "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCES FROM HIGH, MIDDLE AND LOW INCOME COUNTRIES"
Author: Abdul Sattar
Tahir Mahmood
Source: Pakistan Economic and Social Review Vol. 49, No. 2 (Winter 2011), pp. 163-186
Publication Date: December 2011
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: The protection of intellectual property rights has been considered as an engine of economic growth in developed and developing economies. In this study, we analyze the impact of intellectual property rights on economic growth for a balanced panel of 38 countries (11 from high income countries; 16 from middle income countries; and 11 from low income countries) over the period of 1975-2005 by utilizing Ginarte and Park Index of Intellectual Property Rights (2005). The empirical results reveal that intellectual property rights contribute significantly to economic growth. But the impact is found to be more significant in high income countries as compared to middle and low income countries. Similarly, the effect is stronger in case of upper middle income countries as compared to lower middle income and low income countries.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Problems in International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights"
Author: Subhash Jain
Source: Journal of International Marketing Vol. 4, No. 1 (1996), pp. 9-32
Publication Date: January 1996
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Intellectual property rights are policies that assign and protect the rights to earn income from innovative and creative activity. These rights provide legal authority to control the dissemination and commercialization of new information and ideas and to enforce sanctions against their unauthorized use. Intellectual property rights play a critical role in global economic growth and development because they affect the profitability of industrial research and the rewards to creative activity. At the same time, intellectual property rights are controversial because their stronger international protection may come at the expense of higher prices and reduced availability of products, particularly in developing countries. Obviously, developing countries prefer a low level of protection. Traditionally, intellectual property rights were of concern only to a few lawyers specializing in the field. But the enormous expansion in world trade in the 1980s elevated intellectual property rights to new prominence in international trade policy. At the same time, new and emerging technologies have made traditional protection of intellectual property rights inadequate. For these reasons, the topic of international protection of intellectual property rights should be an important subject of concern among international business and marketing scholars. This article provides an overview of intellectual property rights and their international protection. The conflict between the industrialized and developing countries on the level of protection is highlighted. Issues and controversies that affect the field today are examined. Finally, ideas are advanced for further research on the subject.
Link: Full Text

Title: "The Ideology of Intellectual Property Rights in the International Economy"
Author: Donald Richards
Source: Review of Social Economy Vol. 60, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2002), pp. 521-541
Publication Date: December 2002
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Since the arrival of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 a number of side agreements have also been negotiated that seek further rationalization of the emerging global economy. Prominent among these is the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. Enforcement of the TRIPS agreement would involve the multilateral trade sanctions mechanism of the WTO. This paper examines justificatory arguments for the defense of intellectual property rights in the international economy. These arguments are based on the "classic" philosophic writings of Locke, Hegel, and Bentham. It is found that these well-known philosophic defenses for exclusive property rights do not hold up well when applied to intellectual property.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Intellectual Property Rights and Chinese Tradition Section: Philosophical Foundations"
Author: John Alan Lehman
Source: Journal of Business Ethics Vol. 69, No. 1 (Nov., 2006), pp. 1-9
Publication Date: November 2006
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Payment or membership required
Abstract: Western attempts to obtain Chinese compliance with intellectual property rights have a long history of failure. Most discussions of the problem focus on either legal comparisons or explanations arising from levels of economic development (based primarily on the example of U.S. disregard for such rights during the 18th and 19th centuries). After decades of heated negotiation, intellectual property rights is still one of the major issues of misunderstanding between the West and the various Chinese political entities. This paper examines the sources of this problem from the standpoint of traditional Chinese social and political philosophy (specifically Neo-Confucianism). It points out that the basic assumptions about the nature of intellectual property, which arose during the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe, are fundamentally at odds with the traditional Chinese view of the role of intellectuals in society. It suggests that policies which do not take these differences into account, but which attempt to transfer Western legal concepts without the underlying social constructs are responsible for much of the lack of success in the area of intellectual property rights.
Link: Full Text

Title: "European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications"
Author: J. Gregory Sidak
Source: Criterion
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper presents a perspective on remedies in network industries that is informed by American and European experiences with antitrust law and sector-specific regulation. In the United States and the European Union, the topic of remedies in network industries cuts across antitrust law and sector-specific regulation, including telecommunications. The legal and economic understandings of a remedy are not always synonymous. In both legal systems, a remedy is the corrective measure that a court or an administrative agency orders following a finding that one or several companies had either engaged in an illegal abuse of market power (monopolization in the US and abuse of dominance in the EC) or are about to create market power (in the case of mergers). With the exception of merger control where remedies seek to prevent a situation from occurring, legal remedies are retrospective in their orientation. They seek to right some past wrong. They may do so through the payment of money (whether that is characterized as the payment of damages, fines, or something else). Or they may seek to do so through a mandated change in market structure (structural remedies), as in the case of divestiture, or in the imposition of affirmative or negative duties (behavioral remedies).
Link: Full Text

Title: "Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability"
Author: J. Gregory Sidak
Source: Criterion
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: A "price squeeze," or "margin squeeze," is a theory of antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act that concerns a vertically integrated monopolist that sells its upstream bottleneck input to firms that compete with the monopolist's production of a downstream product sold to end users. At issue is the size of the margin between the monopolist's input price and its retail price. Recent antitrust price-squeeze cases have split the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that, because a vertically integrated monopolist may refuse to provide its upstream inputs to its downstream competitors, it may raise the price of its upstream inputs without incurring antitrust liability. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's 2007 linkLine decision rejected such reasoning, notwithstanding Trinko. Predicated on Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Alcoa, linkLine subordinates the protection of consumers to the protection of competitors. It requires access-pricing analysis that more resembles the work of a public utilities commission than that of a federal judge in an antitrust case.
Link: Full Text

Title: "How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights under Global Competition Law?"
Author: J. Gregory Sidak
Source: Criterion
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Competition authorities in foreign jurisdictions have recently adopted or are considering guidelines on applying competition law to intellectual property rights (IPR). A common concern that certain exercises of IPR can restrict competition underlies IPR provisions that would enable competition authorities to compel holders of IPR to license their IP at regulated royalties. The experience of telecommunications regulation in the United States, from the AT&T divestiture in the early 1980s to the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, illustrates the potential harm to competition and innovation that such forced-sharing policies would cause. The AT&T divestiture was a costly exercise that prevented or delayed the introduction of new services. Forced sharing of incumbents' network elements at regulated rates under the Telecommunications Act reduced investment by both incumbents and entrants. Ironically (yet predictably), the competition for local telephone service that the Act sought but failed to foster was provided by wireless and cable operators, which were deliberately left unregulated and thus had both the incentive and means to upgrade and expand their networks to handle mass volumes of voice and data communications. The failure of forced sharing to promote competition and innovation counsels competition authorities to proceed with caution when using competition law to regulate IPR.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Patent Infringement and Strategic Trade Policies: R&D and Export Subsidies"
Author: Moonsung Kang
Source: KIEP - Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Publication Date: November 2000
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Like the original Spencer-Brander result, the R&D incentives that we identify lead governments to set positive R&D subsides in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, we find that if exporting governments could cooperate over their policy choices they would continue to subsidize R&D, rather than agreeing to tax R&D as in the original Spencer-Brander set-up. The reason is that under cooperation they will also agree to share perfectly the results of R&D investments (i.e., eliminate IPR protection), and R&D subsides are then required to maintain appropriate incentives for firms to engage in R&D investments. This last result is interesting for two reasons, both of which point to the importance of examining R&D subsides and IPR policies in tandem as we have done rather than in isolation as has heretofore typically been done. First, by this result we show that the case for strategic R&D subsides is more robust than previously thought, as it applies whether exporting governments are acting cooperatively or non-cooperatively, once their equilibrium choices of IPR protection are taken into account as well. And second, by this result we identify a puzzle as to why governments might wish to agree to jointly eliminate, rather than tighten, their levels of IPR protection, given that hey have at their disposal R&D outcomes. We show that the flavour of these findings extend as well to the case in which governments also have export policies at their disposal. In the original Spencer-Brander set-up, the addition of export policies leads governments to tax R&D and offer export subsides, pointing to another way in which the case for strategic R&D subsides appears to be fragile. But again out results imply that this fragility disappears in a setting in which the choice of IPR protection is modelled well.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors"
Source: Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice
Publication Date: April 2000
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: To provide guidance to business people, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") (collectively, "the Agencies") previously issued guidelines addressing several special circumstances in which antitrust issues related to competitor collaborations may arise. But none of these Guidelines represents a general statement of the Agencies' analytical approach to competitor collaborations. The increasing varieties and use of competitor collaborations have yielded requests for improved clarity regarding their treatment under the antitrust laws.
Link: Full Text

Title: "DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT ON SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION"
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Cyber threats are becoming increasingly more common, more sophisticated, and more dangerous. One way that private entities may defend against cyber attacks is by sharing technical cyber threat information - such as threat signatures, indicators, and alerts - with each other. Today, much of this sharing is taking place. Some private entities may, however, be hesitant to share cyber threat information with others, especially competitors, because they believe such sharing may raise antitrust issues.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data"
Author: Darren Tucker
Hill Wellford
Source: The Antitrust Source
Publication Date: December 2014
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract:
Link: Full Text

Title: "Will New IEEE Standards Policy Devalue Standards Essential Patents?"
Author: William Powell
Source: Baker Hostetler
Publication Date: February 12 2015
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: On February 8, 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) adopted a new patent policy for standards-essential patents (SEPs) in IEEE standards. This comes in the midst of rapid developments in the high tech industry, where courts and other authorities have been attempting to define the rights of owners of SEPs. The new IEEE policy may reduce the licensing value of patents that are essential to implement a product compliant with future IEEE standards. However, there is reason to believe that the net effect on SEP patent valuation may be small.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Compulsory Licensing in Germany"
Author: Philip Maume
Source: Compulsory Licensing, Reto Hilty and Kung-Chung Liu (eds), MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Vol. 22, Springer
Publication Date: May 25 2013
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: In the last 20 years, German courts have developed a sophisticated approach to compulsory licensing of patents. Compulsory licences under competition law are of particularly high relevance. In short, German competition law obliges the holder of a patent, which is essential in a standard to grant a licence on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Users of such patents can also raise a so-called competition law defence against imminent injunction orders. The resonance of the German debate in international scholarly literature has remained relatively low, probably because of the language barrier. Most works merely scratch the surface of the particularly complex issues. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the German legal background and the consequences in practice. It suggests a streamlined, simplified approach to competition-law-based defences.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents"
Author: J. Gregory Sendak
Source: Criterion
Publication Date: January
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro propose that standard-setting organizations (SSOs) mandate that their members henceforth submit to binding, final-offer arbitration (commonly called "baseball arbitration") to set fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) royalties in licensing disputes concerning standard-essential patents (SEPs). SSOs should reject this proposal. It does not rest on sufficient facts or data, nor does it apply intellectually rigorous principles and methods of law and economics in a reliable manner. This is not to say that the voluntary use of arbitration to resolve FRAND licensing disputes is inherently problematic. However, the incremental efficiency that Lemley and Shapiro claim that their proposal would achieve over litigation or conventional commercial arbitration is illusory. For one, it is much harder to value a portfolio of SEPs over the span of five years than to value an individual baseball player for a single season. The Lemley-Shapiro version of mandatory baseball arbitration would not shed light on the question of what constitutes a FRAND offer. To the contrary, Lemley-Shapiro arbitration by design collapses questions of validity, infringement, and essentiality of the patent to the standard into a single damage calculation in which the arbitrator's sole responsibility is to choose one of two disparate estimates of reasonable royalties. Yet, a FRAND offer contains not only a price, but also terms and conditions that (because they are nuanced and possibly tailored to the unique needs of an individual licensee) do not lend themselves to being easily standardized, let alone summarized in a single number, as the description of Lemley-Shapiro arbitration might incorrectly lead some to assume. Lemley-Shapiro arbitration would not say whether a royalty offer was fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Lemley and Shapiro claim that their arbitration proposal offers "best practices" for SSOs. That label is unsupported and misleading. The package that Lemley and Shapiro call "best practices" is in fact not a narrow proposal for binding baseball arbitration but rather a roadmap to redefine patent rights in a manner that would transfer wealth from inventors to infringers. Embedded within Lemley-Shapiro arbitration are normative changes in patent law and policy that Lemley and Shapiro have previously advocated but that SSOs and courts have not adopted. An SSO that adopted Lemley-Shapiro arbitration could expect its members to commercialize their next generation of inventions outside that particular SSO, if not outside an open standard altogether.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Frand Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents"
Author: Jay Pil Choi
Source: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5012
Publication Date: October 21 2014
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders' ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders are discussed.
Link: Full Text

Title: "IEEE's controversial proposed Intellectual Property Rights (&quot;IPR&quot;) Policy amendments"
Author: David Long
Source: Essential Patent Blog
Publication Date: February 3 2015
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: The IEEE apparently is considering an unusual change to its intellectual property rights ("IPR") policy that in many ways is contrary to developing U.S. law on determining a reasonable royalty rate and the availability of injunctive relief for standard essential patents ("SEPs"). The IEEE provides a link to the current draft of this proposed IPR policy change that shows the proposed redline revisions to the current IPR policy. The proposed IEEE revisions have even caught the attention of the popular press and others, such as Sen. Coons' letter to the U.S. Attorney General Holder that calls the proposal an "unprecedented move by an international standards body to weaken the value and enforceability of patented technology."
Link: Full Text

Title: "Advancing Intellectual Property Rights: Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China"
Author: Michel Oksenberg
Pitman B. Potter
William B. Abnett
Source: NBR Analysis (Nov 1996)
Publication Date: November 1996
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Over the past several years protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) has been a significant stumbling block in U.S.-China relations. The unauthorized reproduction and distribution of goods such as computer software and movies in China is widespread. Items pirated by Chinese firms are sold not only in China, but exported throughout East and Southeast Asia as well. The Business Software Alliance estimates that losses to American companies from all property rights infringements are worth more than two billion dollars annually.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Intellectual Property Rights in China: The Changing Political Economy of Chinese-American Interests"
Author: Summer La Croix
Denise Eby Konan
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 39
Publication Date: January 2002
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: We review the evolution of modern Chinese intellectual property right (IPR) laws and enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts over Chinese IPR protection. Our analysis considers why the U.S. and China moved from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights. Structural and institutional aspects of the political economy of IPRs within each country are considered, and data on Chinese-U.S. trade in intellectual property-intensive goods are examined. We conclude that although enforcement if IPRs within China continues to be relatively weak, Chinese IPR institutions are converging on those in the OECD nations.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Digital Information Systems and Global Flagship Networks: How Mobile is Knowledge in the Global Network Economy"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 48
Publication Date: May 2002
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: Two defining elements of the "global network economy" are the evolution of global flagship networks (GFN) and the increasing use of digital information systems (DIS) to manage these networks. Both transformations may gradually reduce constraints to cross-border knowledge diffusion, and hence enhance the mobility of knowledge. We thus need to reconsider and amend the proposition, formalized by agglomeration and innovation economists and network sociologists, that knowledge is less mobile than markets, finance or production facilities. As a first step towards an appreciative theory, the paper explores the role played by DIS for knowledge diffusion within cross-border networks. We highlight opportunities, pressures and incentives that may result from network participation, and explore how they affect the absorptive capacity of local network suppliers.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Standardization Strategy of China - Achievements and Challenges"
Author: Wang Ping
Wang Yiyi
John Hill
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 107
Publication Date: January 2010
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper explores China's standardization strategy after entering WTO and the standardization strategy's current status quo and its roles in economic development and innovation system construction in China. Through the analysis of the achievements of the Study on the Strategy of Technical Standards Project of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the standardization strategies or plans established by governments at all levels, it concludes that the skeleton for standardization strategy thinking has been formed, a real standardization strategy has been established and implemented, and addresses achievements and current challenges.
Link: Full Text

Title: "The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -- Implications for China's Policy on Information Security Standards"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Sheri Martin
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 108
Publication Date: January 2010
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: As the recent dispute between Google and the Chinese government demonstrates, information security-related policy issues are rapidly becoming 'hot button' challenges for China-US relations. In the US media, much of the debate has focused on internet censorship. Equally important are economic impacts and implications for national security of a perceived increase in cyber attacks. In fact, both Chinese and US policy makers are searching for ways to improve the protection of information systems that are of strategic importance for economic growth and competitiveness, as well as national security. And the arsenal of cyber warfare keeps growing by the day. In fact, there is reason to argue that cyber warfare has the potential to morph into a new form of technical trade barriers (TTBs) and hence should be appropriately discussed within the WTO (Ernst, 2009b). A better understanding of the policy implications of information security-related conflicts requires research on the evolving policies and institutions that shape information security standards. This paper looks at an international cooperative attempt to develop a set of "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation," explores its strengths and weaknesses, and examines implications for China's policy on information security standards.
Link: Full Text

Title: "The Challenge of Patent Governance in ICT Standards, Seen from a Patent Authority's Perspective"
Author: Konstantinos Karachalios
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 110
Publication Date: February 2010
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper analyzes the use of proprietary technology in key ICT standards, an important challenge for standards policy. However, the gaming and the loopholes between standardisation and patent system leave enough space for extreme individualist optimisation strategies, and thus considerable rent seeking. Thus, civil society and governments increasingly doubt that the existing regulatory frameworks may guarantee a smooth functioning of both systems in the future. However, strong-handed governmental interventions may lead to de facto trade protectionism and serious geopolitical frictions, according to the European Patent Office's (EPO) Scenarios for the Future analysis. To avoid the worst case scenario, patent authorities should depart from their traditionally reluctant stance and assume a more pro-active role in this field. They can improve governance by increasing transparency and promoting respect of the rules at the interface of the patenting and standardisation process. To achieve this, a structured cooperation and exchange of per se public information between patent and competition authorities as well as formal standardisation bodies is necessary.
Link: Full Text

Title: "Europe's Innovation Union - Beyond Techno-Nationalism?"
Author: Dieter Ernst
Source: East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 132
Publication Date: August 2012
Date Added: February 25 2015
Free/Fee: Free
Abstract: This paper traces recent transformations in Europe's innovation policy--the move towards EU-wide policy coordination in the form of an "Innovation Union." A deep fiscal crisis and increasingly severe austerity policies are slowing down Europe's move towards greater openness and internationalization of its innovation system. The paper asks whether Europe has left behind for good "techno-nationalism," or whether government action in support of high-tech industries through various forms of protectionist policies is re-emerging, this time however on a region-wide scale. This question is of relevance to current policy debates about the role of innovation in the US as well as in Asia's emerging economies. The paper specifically explores what lessons the US and emerging Asia might draw from Europe's move towards an EU-wide Innovation Strategy.
Link: Full Text